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Abstract 
Title:  Value of Hedging in U.S. Airline Industry: A perspective on Firm 
Value and Accounting Performance  
Seminar date:  2011-05-31 
Course:   BUSM36, Degree Project Master level in Corporate and Financial 
Management, Business Administration Master Level, 15 University 
Credit Points (15 ECTS) 
Authors:  Nofil Nadeem, Khondoker Pear Mohammad & Godlisten Mroso 
Advisor:   Maria Gårdängen 
Five key words:  Risk Management, Hedging, Firm Value, Tobin’s q and Accounting 
Performance 
Purpose:  The purpose of this research is to investigate the value premium 
associated with extent of hedging in the U.S airline industry and to 
study the result of hedging on accounting performance as a proxy of 
firm value. 
Methodology:  A quantitative analysis using Multivariate Regression has been 
applied to determine value effects on firm value measures of Tobin’s 
q and accounting variables (ROA, ROE and EPS) 
Theoretical Perspectives:  The classical risk management theory of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) and other subsequent theories which support the notion of 
hedging are used. In addition, accounting performance variables 
explain the accounting perspective of our research. 
Empirical foundation:  The main approach used in our analysis is based on the Allayannis 
and Weston (2001) model to measure firm value. This is 
supplemented with previous empirical research mainly Carter et al 
(2003, 2006) in U.S. airline industry on hedging. 
Conclusion:  During the period 2006 to 2010 the study exhibits the existence of 
hedging value premium of 22.2% if a firm hedges 100% of its fuel 
price risk. Hence, it indicates that higher hedging would increase 
value (Tobin’s q). Moreover, the accounting performance as measure 
of firm value shows no relationship with hedging, and not 
complementing our result of firm’s value (Tobin’s q) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Rising fuel prices have always been a concern for industries whose majority of the 
operating costs is fuel based. A good example of this is the global airline industry in 
which fuel costs comprises approximately 31% of the operating costs at time of higher 
fuel prices.
1
 Keeping this in mind, airline industry is constantly exposed to fuel price risk 
due to changes in economic and natural events. Uncertainty in major oil producing 
countries like Iraq and recent political instability in Libya and natural disasters like 
hurricane Katrina which severely affected United States oil industry all have a certain 
negative effect on airline industry’s cost structure. Recently Arrow Air, a U.S. cargo 
airline filed for Chapter 11, on July 1
st
 2010, solely because of its inability to cope with 
higher fuel prices. To counter these problems, the airline companies hedge their fuel price 
risk by trading futures, forwards, option contracts and many other structured derivatives 
like “oil linked notes”. The purpose of hedging is to reduce volatility in earnings and cash 
flows which leads to higher firm value which is an indicator of firm’s good performance. 
The question is whether these instruments are effective in increasing firm value and are 
able to increase shareholder value in terms of higher dividends, capital gains or equity 
value. 
So this leads us to a clear problem on identifying the extent to which oil price hedging 
creates value. This would further help us to extend our research to see the effects of 
hedging on accounting performance. As hedging reduces earnings volatility and effects 
variables such as net income, it is necessary to see its impact on accounting measures 
which are based on historic data. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The major issue to be answered is to what extent reducing fuel price volatility through 
hedging has value effect on US commercial airlines during the period 2006-2010 and 
                                                            
1 General Aviation Bureau (GAB), http://hubpages.com/hub/rise-in-fuel-prices-airline-industry, Accessed 
April 2, 2011at 1435 hrs. 
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whether accounting measures as a proxy of firm performance, can complement the value 
effect of hedging.  
After identification of our problem it is necessary to explain how we have deductively 
reached to our problem statement. The next heading will discuss the problem statement 
from a general overview of hedging and then explaining which industries hedge and 
whether there is any value effects proved in previous studies. Then we will specify the 
relative importance of fuel as energy source in transportation industry especially airlines 
and why it has become important to perform a new empirical analysis. 
 
1.3 Problem Discussion 
The fact that we live in a non-perfect world where there are taxes, transaction costs, 
information asymmetries and costly bankruptcies, indicates that any attempt to reduce 
these would create value. This is in contrast with Miller and Modigliani (1961) who 
proposed that in a perfect world any attempt to change capital structure and manage risk 
would not affect the firm value.  Shareholders who are considered to be as 
knowledgeable as managers would diversify themselves and would not value the firm’s 
actions on it. 
Considering the fact that risk management does carry some value in the real world, 
theories started to develop on why firms should manage risk and how risk management 
creates value. Hedging reduces financial distress cost, reduces expected tax liability 
according to Smith and Stulz (1985) and reduces underinvestment problem according to 
Myers (1977).  Following these theories, empirical research started to take place 
measuring the impact of these factors on the firm value. The purpose was to identify the 
relationship between risk management and firm value and quantify the value creation. 
For this reason several researchers took different samples like different industries and 
differentiated between financial and non-financial firms’ e.g. Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) tested non-financial firms, whereas, Jin and Jorion (2006) studied the oil and gas 
industry. 
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Hedging could be done based on the nature of the company and its operations, and can be 
divided into commodity, currency and interest rate hedging as identified by Geczy et al 
(1997). Companies that rely on commodities such as metals, oil etc. undergo commodity 
hedging. Firms having international operations and whose revenues are in several 
currency use exchange rate hedging to fix the value of one currency in terms of other 
currencies. Firms with high debt and borrowing requirements invest in interest rate 
hedging to fix the fluctuations in interest rates which can reduce financial distress cost 
and can increase firm value. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) showed that the use of currency derivatives is positively 
related to the firm value using the Tobin’s q model. He studied 720 U.S. non-financial 
firms residing in 35 countries during the period 1990 to 1999. In contrast Hagelin’s 
(2003) investigated Swedish firms’ use of financial hedges against foreign exchange 
exposure and found no evidence on translation exposure hedges used to increase firm 
value. Jin and Jorion (2006) investigated oil and gas industry and found no relationship 
between commodity derivatives and firm value. Similar to this Tufano (1996) found little 
support for hedging in gold mining industry.  
Sticking to the commodity sector and coming across enough empirical evidence, we 
come to know that fuel is the engine of any economy as oil comprises of majority of total 
energy usage by the whole world. One of the heavy users of oil is the transportation 
industry whose rise and fall totally depends on availability and prices of fuel. USA is the 
world’s largest economy having a GDP of $14,802,081million in 2010 according to Euro 
Monitor International
2
. Its transportation sector consumed 27.1% of U.S. total energy 
consumption in 2009 (U.S Department of Energy, Information and Administration), as 
tabulated in Exhibit 1 which shows its heavy dependence on fuel. The airline sector in the 
transportation industry is highly dependent on jet fuel availability and jet fuel prices 
which represent 12% of fuel consumption of entire transportation industry (Airline 
                                                            
2 Euro monitor Global Market Research Blog, (2010) Top 10 largest economies in 2020;  
http://blog.euromonitor.com/2010/07/special-report-top-10-largest-economies-in-2020.html, accessed on 
May 2, 2011 at 1425 hrs. 
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International Issue 2006)
3
. This along with the size of airline industry makes U.S. an 
appropriate target for research to find out how airlines performance is affected by 
changes in any attempt to hedge fuel. For our research we have chosen the airline 
industry, as according to our knowledge empirical research on fuel hedging in airline 
industry  are very few, and the main studies being Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003 and 
2006). The airline industry has gone through waves of mergers and consolidations which 
have reduced the number of airlines with the passage of time. Conditions have changed 
and earlier empirical results may not be practical or relevant anymore. Carter, Rogers and 
Simkins (2003) studied the period 1994 – 2000 which was before the dot-com bubble and 
September 11 attacks. These challenges, especially the September 11 attacks were 
unexpected events which mainly affected the airline industry. In response airline industry 
took special measures to protect themselves like cost cutting measures, extensive hedging 
and change of strategies which were different from the norms. So keeping this in mind 
the empirical evidence needs to be reviewed to see whether the same positive relation 
exists between hedging and firm value and whether the hedging premium of 10% is still 
applicable as found by Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003). Moreover, jet fuel prices 
reached its peak in year 2008 going up to $180 per barrel due to political unrest in Middle 
East and freezing winters in North America which focused production on heating fuel as 
shown in Figure 1on the next page. All such events had a definite impact on the firm’s 
income which is an accounting measure due to increase in firms costs. So it is equally 
important to see the effects of hedging on certain accounting ratios like ROA, EPS and 
ROE as proxy of value. To conclude, a number of related arguments affecting the airline 
industry have made earlier studies less applicable in the current situation and new 
empirical analysis has become necessary. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 Fuel Consumption and alternative fuels, Fuel for Thought, Airline International Issue (2006) 
http://www.atag.org/content/showissue.asp?level1=3&level2=472&folderid=472&pageid=1084 
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Figure: 1 
Jet Fuel and Crude Oil Price ($/barrel) 
 
 
We feel that there is a strong need to update the empirical research to corroborate the 
existing studies mainly Carter et al (2003, 2006) and to further advance this study by 
adding a different perspective of accounting performance. For that reason, we want to 
include certain accounting measures into our research and to prove that not only hedging 
and firm value are interrelated but also that risk management has an effect on accounting 
performance of the firm. This is to further prove the relationships between hedging and 
firm value using two different methods. 
 
1.4 Reasons of the study 
After reading through the problem statement and problem discussion some questions may 
develop into the mind of readers that why U.S. airline industry was chosen. U.S. airline 
industry is chosen due to the fact that U.S has the biggest airline industry comprising 13 
operating listed airlines at present and the nominal amounts hedged are expected to be 
higher than airline industry in other countries so it would provide an accurate measure of 
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the relationship between hedging and firm value. Moreover, as we want to update the 
results of earlier research of Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003, 2006) which were done 
on U.S. market so we have to resort to the U.S. airline industry.   
Another aspect which needs to be addressed is why a period of 2006-2010 was chosen, 
though we are trying to see the changes in results after events like of September 11 2001, 
Iraq war 2003 etc. The reason is that in the period before 2006 there were a lot of mergers 
and bankruptcies in the airline industry which provided incomplete data sets. It was only 
from 2006-2010 that all listed airline companies survived during this period and no major 
restructurings took place. This provided consistent data. From this, we can also infer that 
there is no survivorship bias in our study. 
 
1.5 Aims of the study 
As aim is a long term objective, our aim of the study is to update and to add to earlier 
research in commodity price risk hedging. We would update the research by taking a 
different time period which is from 2006 to 2010 in contrast to the time period between 
1994-2000 in Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003) and 1992-2003 in Carter, Rogers and 
Simkins (2006) As world scenario has changed dramatically after 2000, as mentioned in 
earlier sections, our research would further show whether the hedging value premium has 
changed with respect to previous studies in the airline industry. Our addition to earlier 
empirical studies would be by also including the impact of hedging on measures of 
accounting performance in to our analysis.  As to our knowledge this has not been 
performed earlier in the airline industry. It would provide a foundation for further studies 
in risk management by linking firm value with historic measures like accounting 
performance.  
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1.6 Delimitations 
Our study does not focus on investigating motives and incomes from hedging and for this 
reason this industry is chosen as it does not use derivative instruments for trading 
purpose. We follow the assumption that airlines make no other gains from derivatives 
except hedging their fuel price risk. This is important to consider otherwise firm value 
can be affected both by hedging fuel price and companies gain from trading derivatives 
which will ultimately distort the results. 
A second delimitation imposed by us is publicly listed airlines were selected due to their 
extensive information disclosure about their hedging activities. This delimitation is very 
important in this study because informative hedging disclosure is necessary in order to 
evaluate its effect on firm value. 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
The report continues with Chapter 2 which explains the overview of all the relevant 
literature, theories and empirical evidences related to our study. This chapter ends with a 
summary of the theoretical base used in our study. The third chapter relates to the 
methodology which focuses on our sample data, its characteristics and certain measures 
used to ensure data reliability. All the variables used in the study are also mentioned in 
this chapter. Following this, chapter four explains the use of model in data analysis. The 
results of our research are analyzed in Chapter 5 starting with the main findings and then 
comparing it with earlier studies. Chapter 6 concludes the whole study and then further 
mentions the future research possibilities and specific areas to be focused on.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Risk Management: An Ideal Perspective 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) states that, hedging is a non-zero net present value (NPV) 
decision based on the assumption that transactions are costless, markets are perfect and 
there are no taxes and bankruptcy cost. In such a situation hedging does not produce 
value as shareholders can themselves diversify their shareholdings as best as managers 
can do for them, so there remains no motivation for firm to hedge their transaction 
Contrary to the above description, the real world is different and there are market 
imperfections like different information with different parties e.g.  Managers who have 
insider information, and transactions are costly in terms of search costs, termination costs 
etc. Taxes are charged by government as a source of revenue with different rates on 
corporate, wealth and capital gains. So hedging activity has some value effects and 
financial policy of a firm is relevant. 
 
2.2 Development of theories 
After the results of Modigliani and Miller (1958) were declared as unrealistic, work 
started on how hedging can affect value and what are the motives behind hedging. 
Subsequently, theories began to develop which are discussed as follows; 
 
2.2.1 Financial distress costs 
Financial distress arises when promises to creditors are not being honored or are 
served with difficulty. Such situations can force a firm into bankruptcy or 
liquidation which has costs such as fire sale discounts, advisory fees, legal fees 
etc.  Financial distress is costly as it forces firms to take actions which are against 
the debt holders and non-financial stakeholders such as employees, suppliers and 
customers which propagates adverse selection and impairs the firm’s access to 
credit.  Stakeholder relationships are also affected by conflicts  of interest  
between  borrowers  and  lenders  [Jensen and  Meckling  (1976),  Myers  (1977),  
and  Stulz  (1990)],  between  firms  and  their  nonfinancial stakeholders  [Baxter  
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(1967),  Titman  (1984),  and  Maksimovic  and  Titman  (1990)],  and  between 
shareholders  and  managers  [Gilson  and  Vetsuypens  (1993)  and  Novaes  and  
Zingales  (1993)]. 
Booth, Smith and Stulz (1984) stated that, by reducing the volatility of earnings 
through risk management, firm can reduce the probability of financial distress as 
the firm’s customers will place value on its services which will be reflected in the 
firm’s cash flows in the form of willingness of the customer to pay the price. So 
hedging can be helpful in reducing earnings volatility and hence in controlling or 
reducing financial distress cost. High debt levels may cause firm to default and 
raises financial distress. So hedging increases with debt ratio according to Dolde 
(1995) Haushalter (2000). 
 
2.2.2 Tax incentive 
Tax incentives can motivate corporations to hedge as risk management has effect 
on expected tax liability, debt capacity and interest tax deduction. Such variables 
can increase or decrease firm value depending on their movement i.e. increase or 
decrease.  
Smith and Stulz (1985) hypothesized that, firms having convex tax structure have 
motivation for hedging. As according to Jensen’s inequality firms can reduce their 
expected tax liabilities by hedging which ultimately will reduce income volatility. 
Consequently firm value will increase due to stable earnings which are valued by 
stakeholders. 
The other motivation is increase in debt capacity as explained by Stulz (1996), 
Ross (1997) and Leeland (1998). By reducing the volatility of income or the 
probability of distress through hedging a firm is able to issue more debt in 
response to higher debt capacity which increases the interest tax shield from debt. 
Consequently, a firm’s tax liability is reduced and value of the firm increases due 
to reduced taxes, lesser volatility and interest tax deductions. However, Graham 
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and Rogers (2002) provided evidence that, tax convexity does not seem to be 
influencing hedging decision. 
 
2.2.3 Underinvestment problem 
Another important factor driving risk management is the underinvestment 
problems which as explained by Myers  (1977) and  Majluf  (1984) that managers 
act in the interest of shareholders and turn down positive NPV projects due to the 
fact that the benefits accrue to the bondholders due to their prioritized status. The 
underinvestment problem arises when investment opportunities are negatively 
correlated with cash flows. For instance, airlines suffer from underinvestment 
when opportunity to buy distressed assets occurs during the time of recession 
when the firm itself is financially constrained. Froot et al (1993) and Carter et al 
(2006) showed that removing underinvestment problem was an essential factor 
and will allow firms to get hold of positive NPV projects resulting in higher cash 
flow generation. Bessembinder (1991) argues that, value of debt becomes less 
sensitive to incremental investment decision when a firm undertakes hedging at 
the time of financing. This reduces the motivation of managers to under invest to 
save bondholders. Nance et al (1993) provides evidence that hedging offers 
greater growth opportunities and mitigates underinvestment problems. 
 
2.2.4 Managerial Risk Aversion 
Risk averse managers engage in hedging if their wealth is concentrated in the firm 
and they find that hedging on their own is costly than hedging at the corporate 
level as discussed by Smith and Stulz (1985). Managers who hold company stock 
are more likely to hedge than managers that are rewarded with stock options as 
noted by Smith and Stulz (1985). Tufano (1996) also provides evidence that 
managers who own more stock are more likely to hedge. If it is cheaper for firms 
to hedge than it is for managers, then hedging increases managerial welfare. This 
will increase firm value as managers will not demand risk premium and thus it 
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will reduce managerial compensation. So the motivation for hedging is twofold 
both at the corporate and managerial level. 
 
2.2.5 Other reasons to hedge 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and Breeden and Vishwanathan (1998) supposed 
that, informational asymmetries always exist in shareholder-manager relationship. 
DeMarzo and Duffie further stated that firms should sometimes hedge based on 
private information which cannot be transferred to shareholders without incurring 
any cost. Breeden and Vishwanathan (1998) are of the view that high quality 
manager has incentive to hedge to remove uncertainty and to give a positive 
signal to the market about his performance. Information asymmetry can be 
measured by share ownership of institutions in a firm. High institutional 
ownership firms have motivation to hedge less as founded by DeMarzo and 
Duffie (1991) and Breeden and Vishwanathan (1998). This is because the high 
institutional ownership implies less agency problems as large blocks of shares are 
in hands of few shareholders. Information asymmetry would be less as large 
institutional owners would demand more information and would themselves be 
having their own valuations. However, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) found 
the opposite that firms with high institutional ownership are more likely to hedge. 
 
2.3 Empirical Evidence: Hedging Vs. Firm Value 
Firms engage in hedging activity in one way or the other. Some firms hedge foreign 
currency exposures and interest rate exposures while some engage in commodity price 
risk hedging. Bodnar et al (1996) and Mian (1996) show that firms engage in hedging 
activity to reduce risks. Geczy et al (1997) found that in a sample of Fortune 500 firms 
52.1% use currency derivatives, 44.2% use interest rate derivatives and 11.3% use 
commodity derivatives. Most firms’ hedge to reduce risk and increase firm value but does 
hedging has an effect on firm value? 
 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) used 720 U.S non-financial firms to see the effects of 
hedging on firm value using Tobin’s q as measurement of firm value. Evidence shows 
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derivatives hedging increases firm value by reducing currency risk. Carter, Rogers and 
Simkins (2003) focused on the U.S airline industry and evaluated firm value based on 
hedging oil price risk. They found a hedging premium of 10% and confirmed the positive 
effect of hedging on firm value. The confirmation of the existence of the hedging 
premium of previous studies is an important part of this report as it will re-investigate 
U.S airline industry with latest data which includes recessionary period as well. However, 
Jin and Jorion (2006) came up with contradictory results with past studies on hedging. 
They found negative relationship of firm value and hedging in U.S oil and gas producers. 
 
To sum up, more empirical evidences are required in this area as there are conflicting 
results among the past studies. Consequently, studies based on recent data are necessary 
to incorporate the change of economic circumstances into our research to provide 
accurate results. 
 
2.4 Main Criticisms of earlier researches 
Earlier researches were unable to provide with consistent results in measuring the value 
of hedging. Allayannis and Weston (2001) sampled non-financial firms and found value 
premium, whereas, Jin and Jorion (2006) found no relationship between hedging and firm 
value in the oil and gas industry. It can be argued that hedging results are different in 
foreign currency hedging as founded by Allayannis and Weston (2001) and in commodity 
price risk hedging as performed by Jin and Jorion (2006). Moreover, Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) sample is limited only to large firms having assets above $500million and 
it is unclear whether hedging adds value to the smaller firms as well. The research sample 
of Allayannis and Weston (2001) covers a large number of firms in different industries 
with different growth rates i.e. a heterogeneous sample. The results may vary if the same 
research is done on a specific industry with consistent growth rates. The results of 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) may not be applicable to the oil and gas, gold mining and 
airline industry. This makes it necessary to perform more research into specific areas like 
commodity price hedging such as “fuel”. 
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The research most relevant to our study is Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006). The fuel 
price risk in airline industry done by Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) studied the 
period between 1992 and 2003. The results by Carter et al (2006) may not have depicted 
the actual value affect because it includes data set which was affected by September 11 
2001 incident. This event had a severe negative impact on tourism and so on airline 
companies. Airline companies faced a significant drop in their revenues and market 
values which may have resulted in a downward bias in the results of Carter et al (2006).  
Therefore, more specific and accurate data sets can reveal the true effect of hedging on 
firm value. 
 
2.5 Accounting Performance 
Accounting performance can be measured with profitability measures like Return on 
Assets, Return on Equity and Earnings per share. These are explained in detail below; 
 
2.5.1 Return on Equity (ROE) 
As a profitability measure Return on Equity reflects the effectiveness of a firm in 
using its shareholders funds i.e. how much a firm can earn with its shareholder 
capital. It also reflects the investment opportunities available to a firm and how 
effectively the firm is capitalizing on them. A higher ROE ratio shows good firm 
performance and attracts more capital and shareholder interest. 
 
2.5.2 Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on Assets is another profitability measure which calculates the profitability 
of firm’s assets in place. It shows how much profit is generated from each dollar 
of the invested asset. The higher the ratio the better is it for the firm and it reflects 
the strength of the company and the importance and efficiency of the asset it 
holds. 
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2.5.3 Earnings per Share (EPS) 
Earnings per Share is a shareholder ratio which a shareholder studies before 
investing its capital in a firm. Earnings per share reflects the available earnings 
left to be distributed to shareholders after interest, taxes are paid. The higher the 
earnings per share the more the investors have confidence in the company and 
believes it to be a strong investment. Moreover, this ratio is not the actual cash 
paid to the investor as some of the earnings may have been re invested in the firm. 
All the above accounting performance measures are subject to earnings management as 
they are accrual based according to Sougiannis, Jegadeesh and Konan Chan (2004).  
Management can use different techniques to inflate them and to increase the firm value as 
discussed by Lee, Li, Yue and Heng (2007). 
Empirical evidence on hedging and accounting performance is not available subject to 
our knowledge in the airline industry. We find one study related to this done on non-
financial firms in China in Wieying and Jian (2010). They found hedging has significant 
positive effect on Earnings per share. However, generally it can be implied in the sense 
that when hedging reduces tax liability as mentioned by Smith and Stulz (1985), the 
income available for distribution would increase and ultimately it would have positive 
effect on ROE, ROA and EPS. 
 Due to lack of empirical evidences of the relationship between hedging and accounting 
performance this aspect would be very important part of the research which would add a 
new dimension to the studies of hedging in the airline analysis. 
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2.6 Summary of the theories and empirical evidences 
 
Figure: 2 
Summary of Relevant Theories Empirical Studies and Result 
 
Theory Empirical Evidence Results Convergence/ 
Divergence of 
Results 
 PART I: General Hedging Theories     
Financial Distress  
Smith and Stulz (1985) 
Dolde (1995) 
Haushalter (2000) 
Higher debt which 
is a sign of distress 
leads to increased 
hedging 
Converging 
Results 
Underinvestment 
(Myers 1977) 
Bessembinder 
(1991), Nance et al 
(1993) 
Hedging  reduces 
underinvestment 
Converging 
results 
Tax incentive  
Smith and Stulz (1985) 
Ross(1997),  Leeland  
(1998) 
Hedging reduces 
tax liability 
Converging 
results 
Tax incentive  
Smith and Stulz (1985) 
Graham and Rogers 
(2002) 
Tax incentive does 
not affect hedging 
Diverging 
results 
Managerial Risk Aversion  
Smith and Stulz (1985) 
Tufano (1996) Risk averse 
managers and who 
own more stock 
hedge more 
Converging 
results 
PART II: Studies on Firm Value 
   
Authors Type of Hedging Study Period and 
Market 
Results 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) Currency risk 1990-1999, USA Derivatives 
increases firm 
value 
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003) Oil price risk 1994-2000, USA Positive effect 
on firm value 
Jin and Jorion (2006) Oil and gas price risk 1998-2001, USA No effect on 
value 
Guay and Kothari (2003) Currency and interest 
risk 
1995, USA Not significant 
affect but 
positive. 
The table is divided into two parts .The part 1 explains the general hedging theories and their respective 
empirical evidences and then mentions whether the results were similar to theories (converging) or were 
different (diverging). Part 2 explicitly shows the studies relevant to our study i.e. relationship between 
hedging and firm value. It also mentions the results increase in firm value (positive), decrease in firm 
value (negative) or no effect. 
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The results of the table in the previous page are now discussed. Theories on risk 
management have been empirically proven as well to testify their validity. Theories of 
financial distress as claimed by Smith and Stulz (1985) have been empirically proven by 
Dolde (1995) and Haushalter (2000) that a higher debt ratio which is a sign of financial 
distress leads to increase in hedging. Figure 2 above presents a summary of theories 
studied, their empirical evidences and their respective results. 
It is interesting to find out the tax incentive motive as described by Smith and Stulz 
(1985) has contradictory results in empirical studies, as first round of empirical studies 
done by Ross (1997) and Leeland (1998) show hedging increases firm’s debt capacity 
which motivates it to issue more debt to benefit from tax shields and hence results in 
value creation, whereas, Graham and Rogers (2002) show tax convexity does not seem to 
affect hedging decision. This can be due to different samples in both empirical evidences. 
So this can be taken as a research area in future studies as it requires further clarification. 
The under investment problem as explained by Myers (1977) and Majluf (1984) can be 
overcome through hedging as mentioned by Bessembinder (1991) and Nance et al 
(1993). So, theory is supported by empirical evidence which may be due to the fact that 
similar markets were being observed. Then the major studies regarding firm value and 
hedging such as Allayannis and Weston (2001) which shows a positive relationship and 
Jin and Jorion (2006) depicts no relationship. The most relevant study in our case is 
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003) which is based on airline industry and shows that 
hedging increases firm value. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Type of Analysis 
We are interested in a Deductive Quantitative Analysis of our problem because this study 
necessitates analyzing numbers in the form of percentage hedges to produce output in 
form of changes in firm value (Tobin’s q ratio). As the percentage hedged and Tobin’s q 
is numerical data so it qualifies for quantitative analysis. After this, again percentage 
hedged would be used to analyze its effect on ROA, ROE and EPS which are the 
accounting measures.  
 
3.2 Data collection 
The first task is to find out the number of airlines fully operating till the year 2010. Since 
the merger activity in the airline industry as mentioned in Morrison and Winston (2000) 
and Clougherty (2002), it has been difficult to get the accurate data. The data collection is 
secondary in nature as the research is based on what data is available on internet websites 
such as “Air Transport Association”4, “RITA: Bureau of Transportation Statistics”5, 
“Securities and Exchange Commission 10-K filings”6 etc.  The key operating data 
statistics both at the firm and industry level are found using publications of “International 
Air Transport Association” and “Bureau of Transportation”. Information relating to 
individual hedging activities of the firm like percentage of fuel hedged is obtained from 
“SEC 10-K filings”.  
 
3.3 Data Sample 
We find 122 certificated US Air Carriers operating as at August 2, 2010. These carriers 
include large, medium and small sized, public and private companies including both 
cargo and passenger airlines. For our study we need to find the amount of fuel hedged, 
with this, it is only possible to take companies that are listed and disclose their 
information and have SEC filings. Most of the listed airlines have undergone mergers in 
                                                            
4 http://www.airlines.org/pages/home.aspx 
5 http://www.bts.gov/ 
6 http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
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the past and further reductions have taken place. For instance, in 2000, 27 U.S. airlines 
were investigated by Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003). Reducing the number of airlines 
to listed companies operating at 2011 and which sufficiently report their hedging data, we 
identified 13 major U.S. airlines. Figure 3 below shows the number of airlines and their 
percentages of fuel costs and hedged next year’s fuel requirements. This left us with 65 
firm year observations in the period 2006-2010. 
Figure: 3 
Percentage of Fuel Costs on Operating Expenses and Next Year Requirement Percentage 
Hedged  
 
 
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
To get a quantitative overview of the sample we use, it is necessary to look at the 
descriptive statistics of the data. This includes mean, median and the range. The Exhibit 2 
in the appendix describes the summary statistics of the variables used in the regression 
model. The main important variable is the percentage hedged ratio for the next year’s fuel 
requirement as it is the main independent variable. The mean of this variable is 0.24 and 
the median is 0.25 which shows very little skewness and further tells that there are no 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006/2010 
Airline Companies 
Fuel As % 
of 
Operating 
Cost 
% 
Hedged 
Fuel As 
% of 
Operating 
Cost 
% 
Hedged 
Fuel As 
% of 
Operating 
Cost 
% 
Hedged 
Fuel As 
% of 
Operating 
Cost 
% 
Hedged 
Fuel As 
% of 
Operating 
Cost 
% 
Hedged 
Fuel As % 
of 
Operating 
Cost  
% 
Average 
Hedged 
American Airlines 29.8 14 30.4 24 35.1 35 26.5 24 29.3 35 30.22 26.4 
Airtran 36.5 33 37 43.7 45.5 41.6 31.4 41 34.8 52 37.04 42.26 
Alaska 26 44 27 39 36 50 21 50 27 50 27.4 46.6 
Unied Continental Holdings 21.5 36 27 25 39 34 27 34 31 35 29.1 32.8 
Delta 25 38 26 24 38 62 29 24 30 38 29.6 37.2 
Frontier (Republic Airways) 35 0 28 0 26.8 0 17.3 0 0 0 21.42 0 
Hawaiian Airlines 27.3 18 29.9 14.75 37.9 31 22.7 33.5 26.5 37.5 28.86 26.95 
JetBlue 33.6 38 36.2 13 42.6 8 31.4 40 32.4 28 35.24 25.4 
South West 28 95 29.7 78 35.1 55 30.2 40 32.6 49 31.12 63.4 
US Airways 29.8 29 30.7 28 26 0 18 0 21.6 0 25.22 11.4 
Allegiant Air 46 0 48.1 0 51.2 0 37.9 0 43.6 0 45.36 0 
Skywest Inc.  36.4 0 35 0 37.6 0 16.3 0 13.3 0 27.72 0 
Great Lakes Airlines 24.8 0 28.4 0 35.3 0 24.2 0 27.3 0 28 0 
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outliers in the data. Theoretically, a large difference between mean and median indicates 
presence of outliers and skewness. 
 
3.5 Heteroskedasticity Test 
As we are using panel data with seven cross sections there is likely chance that the 
variance of the error term is not constant as the number of cross sections are high 
according to Froot (1989). Constant value for error term is a necessary requirement for 
the Least Squares Regression Analysis in order to get accurate coefficients and 
confidence interval. Heteroskedasticity can be checked visually and through different 
tests. As E-Views 7 doesn’t support, the White’s test (1980) i.e. Heteroskedasticity Test, 
we alternatively carried out the Visual Test. The Visual Test is based on independent 
variable, % Hedged (PC Hedged) being plotted against the Error Term (E). The Exhibit 3 
in the appendix shows that the variance is very high which shows that the data is highly 
heteroskedastic. The heteroskedasticity causes biasness in test statistics and confidence 
intervals according to Forbes and Rigobon (2002). So we have controlled for 
heteroskedasticity in our study by using cross section weights in the regression as 
discussed by Greene (2003). 
 
3.6 Data Consistency 
To ensure consistency we have included only those airlines which remained till the year 
2011. Airlines which have become subsidiaries formerly as independent are not included 
in the study as it would make incomplete data sets. As mentioned earlier this leads to a 
survivorship bias. As an example Frontier Airlines did not have data for the year 2010 as 
it became subsidiary of Republic Airways in 2009 so it was not incorporated as a separate 
airline in our research. 
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3.7 Hedging Data 
As information regarding jet fuel hedging is the core requirement of this study we took 
strict measures to ensure the accuracy of this data. For this we resort to the SEC 10-k 
filings of the airline companies. In the 10-K filings keywords such as “derivatives” and 
“hedging” are searched to obtain the required information. The data available was the 
hedged percentage of next year’s expected fuel consumption.  Notional amounts of 
derivative contracts were also given but they were divided into assets and liabilities. Due 
to this complexity the notional values were not used and the expected fuel hedged 
requirements were taken. In some cases parent companies were not hedging but 
subsidiaries were hedging e.g. in the case of Republic Airways and its subsidiary Frontier 
was hedging future fuel requirements. In such cases due to the lack of data for 
subsidiaries we take the main or parent company’s hedging strategy. 
The above measures would help in providing an accurate and consistent data for our 
research. It would ensure that the figures of dependent variables of all the firms in this 
study are derived from the same source e.g. the “percentage hedged”. All the airlines 
follow the same disclosure rules in stating their percentage hedge requirements which 
would further add a sense of authenticity and reliability in our study. Taking the values 
from the parent company’s filings would allow us to take a broader view and more 
specific information about the hedging strategy of the whole firm. 
 
3.8 Tobin’s q 
Using the model followed by Allayannis and Weston (2001) we investigate whether fuel 
hedging positively affects the value of the firm. In order, to achieve the results we study 
empirical relationships between Tobin’s q (proxy for firm value) and fuel hedging. 
The q value of a firm set forth by Tobin and Brainard (1968) and Tobin (1969) majorly 
defined as the ratio of Market value of outstanding financial claims of the firm to its 
current assets replacement cost. It’s results can be interpreted as firms having q value 
higher than 1.0 have more ability to generate value from a given set of resources and 
those having values less than 1 are poor at utility and value generation .  
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Corporate performance can be effectively used to measure value as investigated by 
Montogmery and Wernerfelt (1988), Hyland and Diltz (2002), and Megna and Klock 
(1993). 
Studies on airline performances are based on economic measures such as factor 
productivity (TFB) and unit cost methodologies according to Oum & Yu (1998) and 
Oum, Yu and Li (2000). To our knowledge only two studies have been done on airline’s 
using Tobin’s q e.g. Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003, 2006). More studies on this 
would provide an opportunity to either verify or challenge the existing results which will 
open more room for questioning and new research areas. 
 
3.8.1 Reasons for using Tobin’s q 
The first and the foremost reason for selecting q value is that it is a unit less firm 
specific and absolute measure of firm performance. This provides a common 
measure for all companies in a sector. Due to Tobin’s q intrinsic linkage with 
intangible assets of the firm it can provide concrete evidence on the factors 
affecting firm value which can help airline managers to adopt different strategic 
measures. Moreover, Tobin’s q is relatively simple model which gives results 
similar to those generated by complex models as discussed by Perfect and Wiles 
(1995). This simplicity frees us from intense data collection which saves 
computational cost. The relevance of this is higher in our study as the data 
relating to hedging is normally difficult to interpret and is not extensively 
discussed in annual reports. 
 
3.8.2 Tobin’s q Calculation 
In this study we use the model developed by Chung and Pruitt (1994) as opposed 
to complex models of Lindenberg and Ross (1981). The reasons for this choice 
have been discussed earlier. This model is based on the fact that the replacement 
value of assets is approximated by its book value which makes it a simpler 
version. This alleviates the need to collect bond yields as well as different assets 
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replacement values. Tobin’s q in this study has been calculated as follows in 
equation (i) as indicated below: 
 
  
                               
    
     (i) 
Where; 
q = Tobin’s q; 
MVCS = the market value of the firm’s common stock shares; 
BVPS = the book value of the firm’s preferred stocks; 
BVLTD = the book value of the firm’s long-term debt; 
BVINV = the book value of the firm’s inventories; 
BVCL = the book value of the firm’s current liabilities; 
BVCA = the book value of the firm’s current assets; and 
BVTA = the book value of the firm’s total assets. 
The Market value of equity required to compute Tobin’s q is calculated using the 
outstanding shareholders equity from the SEC filings. The Figure 4 in the next page 
shows the values of Market Value of Equity and the respective Tobin’s q figure 
calculated with the above mentioned formula (i). While computing, repurchases of any 
stock is traced and is deducted from issued stockholders’ equity in order to figure out 
outstanding amount. For the market share prices each year the price at the end of 
December i.e. last trading date before the start of a new fiscal year is taken. The reason 
behind is that, almost all the companies have fairly stable prices over the last week of 
trading during the end of the particular fiscal year. 
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Figure: 4 
Market Value of Equity & Tobin’s q 
All Market Values in 000 $ Except Tobin’s q 
 
 
 
 
3.9 Standard Accounting Measures 
A number of accounting performance measures have been used to compare with results 
measured through the Tobin’s q formula. As accounting measures are based on historic 
data and Tobin’s q looks into the future, a comparison between them would provide a 
great deal of information regarding the relevance and the linkages between them. 
We select three different measures which are Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity 
(ROE) and Earning per Share (EPS). These three accounting measures are given as; 
ROE = Net Income/ Total Equity 
ROA = Net Income/ Total Assets 
EPS = Net Income available for distribution/Total outstanding Common Shares 
Net income is taken to be the net profit after corporate tax while total equity includes 
equity attributed to the common stockholders and total assets measured as total current 
and non-current assets as at the end of the reporting period. 
Year Average 
Airline Company MV of Equity
Tobin's 
q
MV of Equity
Tobin's 
q
MV of Equity
Tobin's 
q
MV of Equity
Tobin's 
q
MV of Equity
Tobin's 
q
Tobin's 
q
American Airlines 6,897.42 1.038 3,582.40 0.8004 3,039.76 1.0224 2,617.10 1.0008 2,643.85 1.0137 0.9751
Airtran 1,070.22 0.5114 657.9 0.5411 530.8 0.5922 703.27 0.456 1,002.40 0.4499 0.5101
Alaska 1,678.80 0.8199 1,070.98 0.7109 1,262.76 0.823 1,238.74 0.7554 2,098.10 0.8756 0.797
Unied Continental Holdings 8,435.75 1.0039 3,899.32 0.8195 1,543.22 0.9684 2,163.85 1.0183 7,811.12 0.8612 0.9343
Delta 2,697.79 1.565 4,459.03 0.6721 8,052.77 0.9703 9,045.66 1.026 10,681.23 1.0647 1.0596
Frontier (Republic Airways) 716,652.71 0.9901 713,224.34 1.0277 367,567.45 0.868 255,338.28 0.8266 352,604.40 0.7957 0.9016
Hawaiian Airlines 228,261.18 0.8978 240,929.61 0.8291 328,677.36 0.9788 360,354.77 0.7676 393,731.68 0.7205 0.8388
JetBlue 2,522.05 1.1384 1,071.40 0.8116 1,929.52 0.9554 1,588.62 0.779 1,947.88 0.8457 0.906
SouthWest 12,275.70 1.2531 9,788.25 0.9203 6,929.31 0.9501 9,214.85 1.0437 10,474.72 1.013 1.0361
US Airways 4,915.64 1.1075 1,351.33 0.6038 882.1 0.8834 779.74 0.87 1,620.37 0.854 0.8637
Allegiant Air 547,357.55 1.749 656,784.72 1.5626 973,455.46 2.2551 922,632.18 1.7033 935,846.63 1.862 1.8264
Skywest Inc. 1,738,393.20 0.8794 1,877,643.99 0.8815 1,333,658.10 0.7364 1,245,518.96 0.7052 1,172,310.14 0.66 0.7725
Great Lakes Airlines 31,943,371.90 1.2998 32,411,531.00 1.0274 21,437,955.00 1.3187 20,008,758.00 0.7303 24,296,349.00 0.7004 1.0153
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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3.10 Dependent Variables 
In our study we have mainly four dependent variables. The First and the foremost is the 
Tobin’s q which measures the firm value. For measuring accounting performance we 
have three variables which are Return on Asset, Return on Equity and Earnings per 
Share. 
 
3.11 Independent Variables 
The main independent variable which has been used in the regression analysis is the 
percentage hedged at the year-end for the next year’s fuel cost. Considering only hedging 
with the Tobin’s q would be meaningless as there are other variable which may be 
affecting the firm value. So in order to accurately measure the one to one relationship 
between hedging and Tobin’s q, certain variables should be controlled.  We use the same 
controlling variables as used in Allayannis and Weston (2001) except one variable which 
is “liquidity”. Allayannis and Weston (2001) did not use this variable but concerning the 
situation of airline industries after different economic changes this variable is highly 
relevant. The same variables have been used for the analysis of accounting performance 
to ensure logical comparison with the widely used Tobin’s q methodology.  All the 
independent variables used are as follows: 
 
3.11.1 Firm Size 
Size has remained controversial as previous researches show contradicting results 
on size and firm value. However, it qualifies for a control variables as large firms 
are more likely to hedge than smaller firms due to their better resources, improved 
knowledge and having proper risk management departments. Bodnar et al (1998) 
and Hagelin (2003) show the positive relationship between size and hedging. We 
have taken log of total assets as a proxy for firm size. The more the size of the 
firm the accounting performance is expected to be better because larger sizes 
relates to the economies of scale, which reduces costs per unit thus reducing the 
operating expenses of the firm. This reduction ultimately affects net income 
which positively affects accounting measures like ROA, ROE and EPS. 
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3.11.2 Liquidity 
Cash constrained firms are more likely to invest in positive NPV projects 
according to Jensen (1986). So firms that have less liquidity have more chances to 
have higher Tobin’s q value because of the free cash flow argument. We have 
used current ratio as a proxy for firm liquidity. Therefore, liquidity is expected to 
have a negative influence on firm value. However, higher liquidity is expected to 
have positive affect on accounting performance because higher liquidity allows 
the firm to invest more generating more revenues, irrespective of the value it 
generates. These higher revenues lead to higher incomes thus having a positive 
impact on accounting measures. 
This variable is not used in the Allayannis and Weston (2001) but used in the 
research of Pramborg (2003). This is an important variable because during our 
research period most firms had lower liquidity. Out of 65 firm year observations 
only 9 observations are those in which liquidity was higher. This shows that most 
of the firms had lower liquidity which may affect firm value. So this variable 
needs to be controlled. 
3.11.3 Leverage 
We expect a positive relationship between leverage and firm value because higher 
leverage may cause the management to be more efficient and furthermore 
leverage increase the tax benefits of debt according to Jensen (1986). However, 
according to Fama French (1998) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) negative 
relationship exists between leverage and q value. So to control this affect debt to 
total asset ratio is taken as a proxy for leverage. The total short and long term debt 
is taken to get accurate results. 
On the accounting aspect of our research, higher leverage is taken to be positively 
correlated to our accounting dependent variables due to the fact that higher 
leverage induces firms to invest more to generate the required returns which affect 
the firm’s net income. Moreover, firms try to become efficient to cover interest 
payment costs so as to avoid defaulting on their loans and end up violating debts 
covenants. 
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3.11.4 Profitability 
Profitable firms are more likely to have higher firm value so this is an important 
variable to control.  Return on Asset is used as a proxy because the firm value is 
based on how well the assets can be utilized to produce higher per dollar returns. 
We expect a positive coefficient on this variable. Again the higher the 
profitability the higher would be the accounting variables as they are directly 
based on income and profit figures. So we expect a positive relationship between 
our dependent accounting variables and the independent variables. 
 
3.11.5 Investment Opportunities 
Based on the Allayannis and Weston (2001) approach we have taken Capital 
expenditure over sales as measure for investment opportunities. Froot et al (1993) 
and Geczy et al (1997) show that firms hedging is positively related to investment 
opportunities i.e. higher the hedging the more the investment opportunities so we 
expect a positive relations between them. 
The same relationship exists for the accounting measures because higher 
investment opportunities are reflected into the sales and revenue figures which are 
accounting figures. Therefore, accounting figures are dependent on sales and 
income levels which have a positive relationship with investment opportunities. 
 
3.11.6 Dividends 
If hedgers have limited access to financial markets it may cause their Tobin’s q to 
have higher values. This is because limited financial access will motivate the 
companies to undertake only projects with higher Net Present Value (NPV). To 
account for this we have taken dividends as a proxy. Dividend would be treated as 
dummy variable equal to one if dividend is paid otherwise zero. The rationale 
behind is that firms paying dividends are less likely to face financial constraint as 
they can increase their investment spending by reducing their dividends refer to 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). So we expect a negative relationship 
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between dividends paid and firm value as higher dividends may cause a company 
to over invest and pursue negative NPV projects. 
It is important to note that dividends have no relation with ROA, ROE and EPS 
because these dividends do not affect the net income values as they are accounted 
after net income has been calculated. 
Other control variables such as industrial and geographic diversification used in 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) are not included as almost all airlines operate in 
one segment and have no industrial diversification. The operations are similar. 
Moreover, geographic diversification is also not a correct measure because of the 
fact that our report is based on large listed U.S. airlines that have operations in 
different geographic areas. So adding geographic diversification would distort the 
results as no distinction can be made between the companies. This variable is not 
considered to be important. The Figure 5 in the next page summarizes the above 
information with expected coefficient signs. 
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Figure: 5 
Expected Regression Coefficients 
 
Dependent Variable Tobin's q    
 
Dependent Variable ROA 
Independent Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
 
Independent Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Percentage Hedged + 
 
Percentage Hedged + 
Firm size (Ln Assets)              + 
 
Firm size (Ln Assets)              + 
Liquidity (Current ratio) - 
 
Liquidity (Current ratio) + 
Leverage (debt to asset) + 
 
Leverage (debt to asset) + 
Inv. Opp (Capex/Sales) + 
 
Inv. Opp (Capex/Sales) + 
Profitability (ROA) + 
 
Dividends (dummy) N/A 
Dividends (dummy) - 
 
  
     Dependent Variable ROE 
 
Dependent Variable EPS 
Independent Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
 
Independent Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Percentage Hedged + 
 
Percentage Hedged + 
Firm size (Ln Assets)              + 
 
Firm size (Ln Assets)              + 
Liquidity (Current ratio) + 
 
Liquidity (Current ratio) + 
Leverage (debt to asset) + 
 
Leverage (debt to asset) + 
Inv. Opp (Capex/Sales) + 
 
Inv. Opp (Capex/Sales) + 
Profitability (ROA) + 
 
Profitability (ROA) + 
Dividends (dummy) N/A 
 
Dividends (dummy) N/A 
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4. REGRESSION MODEL  
4.1 Regression Analysis 
4.1.1 Nature of data 
The data we have used is panel data as it has both cross sectional and time series 
dimension. As a subject e.g. airline is studied on different basis like leverage, size over a 
period of years so this makes it a panel data. Panel data is attractive because it offers 
solution to the bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity as mentioned by Baltagi (1995) 
and it reveals dynamics that are difficult to detect in cross sectional data.  
 
4.1.2 Choice of Regression Model 
For panel data the models that fit are fixed effects regression and random effects 
regression.  As there are some variables which are unobservable and have to be 
controlled so we recommend a fixed effects model in which these variables are constant 
over time but differ among subject i.e. airline. Moreover, we can control them without 
even measuring them which simplifies the process. Further to see, whether our choice of 
fixed effect is accurate and whether there are significant fixed effects we carried out the 
“Redundant Fixed Effects Test”. The result of the test is shown below: 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
    
Cross-section F 9.2254 (12,45) 0.000 
 
The results in the table above show a high f- statistic value and a low probability showing 
significant fixed effects. So the choice of fixed effects model is appropriate in our 
research. 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
4.1.3 Regression Equation 
The general panel data regression model is narrated in the equation (ii) as follows: 
  
yit = α + β'Xit + uit          (ii) 
  
Whereby; uit represents time invariant fixed effects. 
 
The equation (iii) is derived after running our model including the dependent and 
explanatory variables is as follows: 
 
LNTOBINSQ = C (1) + C (2)*PC_HEDGED + C (3)*CR + C (4)*DIVIDEND + C 
(5)*DTA + C (6)*LNTA + C (7)*CAPEXSALES + C (8)*ROA + [CX=F] (iii) 
 
4.2 Methodological Issues 
We have chosen the period 2006 to 2010 to determine the effect of hedging on U.S. 
airline industry as we are trying to update the results of previous research. Period before 
2006 have already been tested and a replication of it would not be adding value to 
existing research studies. Moreover, going further before 2006 would distort the results 
due to the presence of the affects of September 11 attacks in the U.S. which really 
affected the U.S. airline industry for few years. This would add outliers to the data which 
would make the research results different from that would be under normal conditions. 
 
4.2.1 Validity 
Validity is an important measure to check the strength of our conclusion, 
inferences or proposition. According to Cook and Campbell (1979) validity is the 
“best available approximation to the truth or falsity of a given inference, 
conclusion or proposition”. The internal validity of our research is strong as both 
the Tobin’s q and hedging have a causal relationship with each other. As hedging 
affects the firm value as it results in higher market valuation by the investors 
especially when earnings are highly variable. It can also be opposite in the sense 
that hedging incurs cost and is not valued by investors. We ensured internal 
validity by adding control variables in our research which would make sure that 
any change in Tobin’s q is due to hedging. 
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The external validity means that the method and results are applicable in other 
settings as well e.g. for European Airlines. This validity has been strong in our 
case as we used Tobin’s q measure which can be applied to any industry be it oil 
and gas as showed by Jin and Jorion (2006), in airlines as proved by Carter, 
Rogers and Simkins (2003, 2006) or other commercial corporations according to 
Pramborg (2003). The results of all the previous researches mentioned according 
to my knowledge and mentioned in this report were similar that hedging creates 
value except in one study which is Jin and Jorion (2006) that hedging is not value 
creating. Therefore, we can observe that there is consistency between the results 
and method used in this area of study even in different studies at different times. 
Hence, validity is not serious matter in our research as evidences of strong 
validity are present. 
 
4.2.2 Reliability 
Reliability means the consistency of the results or observations at different times. 
As our analysis is a quantitative analysis which is measured through E-Views 7 
the results would be similar if we enter the same input information i.e. the 
variables and use the same assumptions. The reliability of the data has been seen 
by checking the SEC filings published in the company websites and the one’s 
published in the SEC website. We have not used annual reports from the website 
which are not 10-k filings as such reports normally differ from the 10-k filings 
registered with the SEC. So data consistency has been ensured at all levels as we 
incorporated the most reliable source of information (SEC filings) into our study 
which is the same in all web sources. 
The test/retest method can be used to see the reliability of our methodology. 
Moreover, our study is formula (Tobin’s q) and equation based (regression), the 
output should be the as long as the same inputs are used. 
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5. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 Industrial Study 
 
Figure: 6 
Percentage Fuel Operating Expenses Hedged for US Selected Airlines 2006-2010 
 
 
The Figure 6 above shows that, out of 13 airlines 9 hedged throughout the period except 
AirTran which did not hedge in 2006. Southwest airline is the airline that hedged in the 
entire period from 2006 to 2010 and has reached the maximum of hedging in the year 
2007 which is about 95%.  There were four airlines which did not hedge at all, namely 
Great Lakes, Allegiant, SkyWest and Republic Airways. The average hedged ratio 
remained stable for the majority of the companies ranging between 20% - 30%, except 
the US Airways, Jet Blue and Southwest. Southwest had an extremely high average 
hedged percentage crossing 60% because of its higher hedge ratio during the period. 
Southwest airline has proven to be the highest hedger of next year’s fuel consumption. 
This is due to the fact that it is the third largest carrier based on number of passenger 
transportation in U.S and it hedges all types of fuel used in operations such as crude oil, 
heating oil and unleaded gasoline. Overall the hedging percentage is highly fluctuating 
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among all the companies throughout the period e.g. SouthWest increased hedging in 2007 
but in 2008 it reduced its percentage. All is dependent upon the fuel requirements of the 
following year and the management’s decision to hedge keeping in mind all the external 
factors such as hikes, economic policy and supply considerations. 
The next figure explains the results of the Tobin’s q with the help of a graphical 
illustration. 
Figure: 7 
Tobin’s q Summary 
 
 
The major findings that can be derived from the above trend is that most of the 
companies and Tobin’s q value as measured using the formula described earlier is below 
1 in all the years. However, Allegiant Air is an exception. During the entire period the 
Tobin’s q value of Allegiant Air was above 1.5 which can be an outlier in this case and 
may cause distorted results but this can be offset by the extreme lower Tobin’s q value of 
AirTran which has remained below 0.6 throughout the study period. The most striking 
result is in 2008 when it crossed q value of 2. Delta airline also has one similar 
observation in year 2006 but after that situation seems to be normalized. The main reason 
of higher values of Allegiant Air is that as it is a smaller airline it has lower value of 
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assets (denominator of Tobin’s q) or higher market value (numerator of Tobin’s q) which 
has made its Tobin’s q very high. Moreover, the share price of Allegiant is very high and 
had an increasing trend as compared to its competitors reaching $49/share in 2010. All 
these factors contributed to an abnormal Tobin’s q value for the Allegiant Air. 
 
Figure: 8 
Correlation Analysis 
 
Variables LNTOBINSQ PC_HEDGED LNTA DTA DIVIDEND CR ROA 
CAPEX 
SALES 
         
LNTOBINSQ 1 
       
PC_HEDGED (0.12) 1 
      
LNTA (0.25) 0.48 1 
     
DTA (0.14) 0.38 0.59 1 
    
DIVIDEND 0.00 0.10 0.11 (0.45) 1 
   
CR 0.00 (0.36) (0.23) (0.65) 0.58 1 
  
ROA 0.05 (0.22) (0.49) (0.55) 0.14 0.27 1 
 
CAPEXSALES 0.05 0.06 0.30 0.24 (0.08) (0.14) (0.11) 1 
This table shows the correlation among different variables used in the regression analysis. It also shows 
multi co-linearity among the variables used. 
The above correlations depict the relatedness of different variables. Highly correlated 
variables are said to be similar and can distort the results.  This multi co-linearity makes 
it hard to distinguish or to figure out the exact coefficient or the magnitude effect of any 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable.  Highly related explanatory variables 
affecting the dependent variable would be similar because of their high correlation. So 
the actual inferences may be distorted in the case of multi co-linearity being present 
amongst any explanatory variables. Moreover this will result in higher standard errors 
and bring instability in the coefficient estimates. 
In this study it can be seen that most of the variables having a correlation below a level 
that does not indicate multi co-linearity. This was based on Kennedy et al (2003) that 
suggested a value as high as 0.8 and 0.9 in the correlation matrix indicates high 
correlation amongst the explanatory variables. Since all the explanatory variables are well 
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below that level in this study so it can be assumed that there is no multi co-linearity 
amongst them.  
 
Figure: 9 
Estimation of the Relationship between Volatility and Hedging Behavior into Firm’s Value  
 
  2006 – 2010 
Variable Coefficient 
 
P-Value 
 Constant 7.1489 *** 0.0000 
 PC_HEDGED 0.2226 * 0.0943 
 LNTA (0.3408) *** 0.0000 
 CR 0.0294 
 
0.8054 
 DTA 0.2988 ** 0.0204 
 DIVIDEND 0.1538 
 
0.3027 
 CAPEXSALES 0.0659 
 
0.6902 
 ROA 0.0507 
 
0.8279 
 
     R
2
 – Adj 
  
0.6412 
 P -Value, F-Stat 
  
0.0000 
 # Observations 
  
65 
 This table reports the results of the regression estimation of variables including hedging behavior into the 
natural logarithm of Tobin’s q (lntobin’s q) as a dependent variable. One regression is run for the period 
of 2006/2010 using Panel EGLS (Using Cross-section Weights) of a sample of 13 airlines and 65 
Observations. Statistical significances at the level of 10%, 5%, 1% level is indicated by *, **, and *** 
respectively. 
 
PC_HEDGED is percentage hedged of next year’s fuel requirements which measures hedging. LNTA is 
natural logarithm of total assets to control for size. CR is current ratio to control for liquidity. DTA is 
debt to total asset ratio to control for leverage. DIVIDEND is dummy variable. CAPEXSALES is capital 
expenditure over sales to control for investment opportunities. ROA is Return on Assets as a control 
variable for profitability. 
 
Consistent with the results of Carter et al (2006) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) our 
results show a positive and significant relation of hedging with firm value at 10% 
significance level. This reveals that the greater the next year’s fuel requirements are 
hedged the higher the firm value. The firm who hedges 100% of its next year 
requirements would contribute 22.22% premium to its value as compared to those who do 
not hedge. The hedging premium is higher than 5% as measured in Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) and 10.2% of Carter et al (2006). An explanation for this higher value as 
compared to Carter et al (2006) is due to the fact the fuel prices today constitute a larger 
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part of the operating cost, see Figure 10 below, both because of higher fuel cost and 
higher fuel requirements. Higher fuel cost is attributed to the demand and supply factors 
and higher fuel requirements are because of the airline’s more demand for fuel because of 
extended routes and more coverage. The higher value premium  in our study is maybe 
because of the changes in “Market value of Equity” (MVE) in the Tobin’s q formula, as 
today’s world is full of  uncertainty which motivates investors to put higher value on 
firms who hedge their price risk. Furthermore, as fuel prices fluctuate a lot, so investors 
cannot hedge themselves and do not have the required information which makes hedging 
more valuable if it is performed by the company itself. 
 
Figure: 10 
Fuel Cost Trend as % of Total Operating Cost in US Airline Industry 
 
  Fuel Cost 
Period as % of Total  
  
Operating 
Cost 
  
1970s 16.3 
1980s 20.7 
1990s 12.2 
2000s 19 
  
Average % 17 
2010 24.6 
Sources: ATA, http://www.airlines.org/Energy/FuelCost/Pages_Admin/FuelCost.aspx, Accessed on May 
17, 2011 at 1357 hrs. 
 
In addition to the main hedging variable, other variables which are control variables 
would now be discussed in relation to the dependent variable. Using Tobin’s q as the 
dependent variable the results are similar to the past studies. First the estimate of size as 
measured by natural logarithm of total assets is highly negative and highly significant 
showing that larger size does not provide an advantage to the firm value. This is 
consistent with the finding of Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Lang and Stulz (1994) 
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on size but is different from what we expected according to Nance et al (1993) and Mian 
(1996). The actual result is different from the expected because bigger size can also lead 
to inefficiency and higher hedging costs which reduces firm value. The leverage measure 
which is debt to total asset (DTA) is positively correlated with firm value and is 
significant. This is consistent with the fact that more leverage causes higher firm value 
due to the tax benefits according to Graham (2000), monitoring effects of debt and 
managerial efficiency according to Ross (1977). Leverage is similar to our expectations. 
The insignificant variables are the liquidity which is measured by current ratio, 
profitability as measured by return on assets, investment opportunities measured by 
capital expenditure over sales and dividend. The insignificance of liquidity and dividend 
dummy is similar to the results achieved by Pramborg (2003) who studied the effects of 
derivative hedging on firm value in Swedish firms. Return on Assets and investment 
opportunities provide different results from past studies which can be explained through 
the concept of reverse causality. In previous studies the significant positive relationship 
between firm value and investment opportunities and profitability was maybe because 
higher firm value creates more incentives of higher investment opportunities and higher 
profitability rather than the opposite. Other reasons can be due to the fact that also 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) results were significant because they used the pooled 
regression method in contrast with the panel method we used. Dividends have a positive 
coefficient in our study which is similar to the results of Carter et al (2003, 2006) but in 
contrast with the negative sign of Allayannis and Weston (2001). As the Carter (2003 and 
2006) studies were based on airline industry resembling our sample, it can be explained 
as a reason for the different result between Allayannis and Weston (2001) and our study. 
The significance of dummy variable in our study matches with Carter et al (2006) as it 
uses the fixed effects model whereas; Carter et al (2003) used FGLS methodology and 
pooled regression without the fixed effects. It can be argued that our dividend results may 
be different from other studies because of the type of method followed in the regression. 
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5.3 Our study results vs. earlier research 
The figure below provides a brief overview of the results of this study with the previous 
studies so that major similarities and differences can be identified with a quick glance.   
 
Figure: 11 
Study Results 
 
Variables Our Study 
Allayannis and 
Weston(2001) 
Carter et al 
(2003) 
Carter et al 
(2006) 
    
 Hedging +  significant + significant + significant +significant 
Firm Size - significant - significant - significant - significant 
Leverage + insignificant + significant - insignificant + significant 
Liquidity + insignificant N/A N/A N/A 
Profitability + insignificant + significant + insignificant + insignificant 
Investment 
Opportunities 
+ insignificant + significant + insignificant 
+insignificant 
Dividend + insignificant - significant + significant + insignificant 
 
5.4 Accounting Performance  
As accounting ratios are historic on nature as they are based on the historic data of 
income statement and balance sheet, we will analyze whether hedging has any effects on 
historic measures of performance as value measure. The higher the Return on Assets, 
Return on Equity and Earnings per share of a firm the higher the investors place value on 
the firm as they seem to be more profitable, generating higher returns and thus creating 
more shareholder wealth.  
The regression results of accounting performance will be presented and discussed on the 
figures in the next page. It will show the coefficient size and sign of independent 
variables with respect to the dependent variable which are the accounting ratios such as 
EPS, ROA and ROE. 
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Figure: 12 
EPS as Dependent Variable 
 
 
2006 – 2010 
Variable Coefficient 
 
P-Value 
 
   
  Constant 0.0152  0.9997 
PC_HEDGED (4.9412) *** 0.0001  
DTA (4.3364) *** 0.0033  
CR (1.7570) *** 0.0002  
LNTA 0.2046  0.8919  
CAPEXSALES 0.4883  0.9023  
ROA 84.3975 *** 0.0000 
 
     # Observations 
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 The table above represents the regression results of the Dependent Variable Earning Per Share (EPS) to 
the Independent variables to the firm. One regression is run for the period of 2006/2010 using Panel 
EGLS (Using Cross-section Weights) of a sample of 13 airlines and 65 Observations. Statistical 
significances at the level of 10%, 5%, 1% level is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 
Figure: 13 
ROA as Dependent Variable 
 
  2006 – 2010 
Variable Coefficient 
 
P-Value 
 
     Constant (4.0963) *** 0.0000 
 PC_HEDGED 0.0218  0.6169 
 CR 0.0456  0.1106 
 DTA (0.0467) * 0.0981 
 LNTA 0.1839 *** 0.0000 
 CAPEXSALES 0.1082 * 0.0627 
      # Observations 
  
65 
 The table above represents the regression results of the Dependent Variable Return on Assets (ROA) to 
the Independent variables to the firm. One regression is run for the period of 2006/2010 using Panel 
EGLS (Using Cross-section Weights) of a sample of 13 airlines and 65 Observations. Statistical 
significances at the level of 10%, 5%, 1% level is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
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Figure: 14 
ROE as Dependent Variable 
 
  2006 – 2010 
Variable Coefficient 
 
P-Value 
 
     Constant  5.6466 
 
0.5961 
 PC_HEDGED 0.1257 
 
0.6666 
 DTA (0.7044) *** 0.0005 
 CR 0.0981 
 
0.7431 
 LNTA (0.2381) 
 
0.6043 
 CAPEXSALES (0.1584) 
 
0.8478 
 ROA (0.4250) 0.8061 
      # Observations 
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 The table above represents the regression results of the Dependent Variable Return on Equity (ROE) to 
the Independent variables to the firm. One regression is run for the period of 2006/2010 using Panel 
EGLS (Using Cross-section Weights) of a sample of 13 airlines and 65 Observations. Statistical 
significances at the level of 10%, 5%, 1% level is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
The results show that, hedging is highly significant in the case of earnings per share 
according to Figure 12. But contradictory to our expectation and results of one study 
Weiying and Jian (2010), our study has a significant negative effect on EPS with a 
coefficient reaching 5. The major reason of this negative relationship is due to the fact 
that cost of hedging is accounted in the income statement under the headings of 
“Operating Expenses” 7 in the section of “fuel and oil” and under the “Other Expenses” in 
which “other gains and losses” account for this. Premium paid for hedge contracts are 
recorded in “other gains and losses” 8 and the change in the market value of contracts due 
to change in fuel prices is recorded in “fuel and oil” 9 category for effective settled 
hedges
10
 that qualify for hedge accounting
11
. Those that do not qualify for hedge 
accounting i.e. those where energy prices are highly volatile the changes in value are 
charged to “other gains and losses” As both of these costs “fuel and oil” and “other gains 
and losses” constitute most of the airline’s cost, these values are highly affected by the 
amount of hedging undertaken. Therefore, the higher the extent of hedging, the higher 
                                                            
7 Included in  Item No.8 in the Statement of Operations of SEC filings of  the airline companies 
8 ibid 
9 ibid 
10 Those which qualify for hedge accounting and are charged in “fuel and oil” category 
11 It determines how a financial derivative is measured after its recognition and where the changes in fair 
value are to be reported in the income statement or balance sheet. 
45 
 
these costs will be and which in turn will reduce the net income available to shareholders. 
Keeping this view in mind the higher extent of hedging relates to higher a premium, 
settlement and market value loss which reduces the EPS and hence, EPS is negatively 
associated with the extent of hedging. Further to this evidence, the results of Weiying and 
Jian (2010) was based on non-financial firms with a sample size of more than 1000 firms 
which makes its results less applicable to our study which is based on the airline industry. 
The significant negative relationship of leverage and liquidity with EPS is inconsistent 
with our expectations. This holds because higher leverage and liquidity will raise the 
chances of financial distress and selecting negative NPV investments which incurs costs 
for the company. ROA on the other hand is consistent with our expected results as both 
of these are based on net income figures so the higher the ROA the higher would be the 
EPS. It should be noted that the coefficient is very high reaching up to 84 showing strong 
correlation. 
The same goes for the dependent variable ROA refer to Figure 13. Firm size gives the 
results similar to what we expected but leverage, on the other hand is inconsistent with 
our positive expectation. This is due to the fact that as airline is a capital intensive 
industry, higher leverage may cause a larger proportionate increase in assets as compared 
to the increase in income, hence reducing firm value and increasing the breakeven point. 
Liquidity is in contrast with what we find in the regression result of EPS. Here the 
liquidity is different from our expectation and shows a positive relationship with measure 
of firm value which is ROA. This can be because of the fact that lower liquidity causes 
firms to reject some positive NPV projects according to Jensen (1986). This is also in 
accordance with our expectations. 
In measuring ROE according to Figure 14 as a measure of firm value we see that hedging 
has no effect on value and the only significant results is with its relation to leverage. The 
result on leverage is in accordance with what we got in the analysis of ROA and EPS 
with respect to coefficient sign but the results are different from what we expected in the 
beginning. This is because higher leverage may cause interest payments on debt, leaving 
less for distribution to the equity holders. Other independent variables are insignificant in 
the analysis and hence, require no further explanation. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The U.S airline industry provides a strong foundation to test whether the extent of 
hedging relates to firm value and to what extent accounting performance variables act as 
an alternative measure of firm value. This is due to the fact that the variation of hedging 
in firms in U.S. airline industry starting from US Airways who on average hedged 11.4% 
of their next year’s fuel requirements, and going to SouthWest whose average hedge was 
63.4%. This variation will be able to accurately measure the extent of hedging and to 
answer whether higher hedging creates more value using both Tobin’s q and accounting 
measures. 
Our study finds that airlines employing jet fuel hedging trade at a premium and a 100% 
fuel hedging cause 22.2% increase in firm value as measured with Tobin’s q. The result 
is consistent with the findings of Allayannis and Weston (2001) that hedging adds value. 
Moreover, it suggests that the contradictory results of Jin and Jorion (2006) maybe due to 
their choice of the sample. Guay and Kothari (2003) questions the validity of the results 
produced by Allayannis and Weston (2001), while our research gives a clearer picture 
and significant finding that hedging adds value because of the reduction of fuel price 
exposure. Based on the value premium of hedging which is approximately 12.2% higher 
than earlier studies mainly Cater et al (2003) airlines should hedge more of their fuel 
price risk to have a positive effect on the firm value. This is because of the fact that fuel 
costs today are a larger proportion of total cost of airline companies. Our results are 
robust to various controls such as size, leverage, dividends, investment opportunities and 
profitability, and also the different regression control to check for heteroskedasticity and 
outliers. 
With the dual  aim of adding to previous researches and bringing in something new to 
this field we investigated hedging against accounting measures of ROA, ROE and EPS as 
measures for value. As these measures are based on historic data it is good to see whether 
both the futuristic approach (Tobin’s q) and historic approach (accounting measures) 
coincide while finding value effects of hedging on airlines. We find that the results are 
not complementary to each other in the two approaches of firm value, one indicating 
higher Tobin’s q value through hedging and the other supporting no and even negative 
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relationship between accounting performance and hedging. The results are highly 
significant when EPS is the value measure and shows a negative relationship between 
hedging and EPS showing higher hedging will lead to lower EPS. Hedging is 
insignificant in explaining changes in other firm value accounting measures like ROA 
and ROE. The measures for robustness have been the same as used in the Tobin’s q with 
same control variables. As to our knowledge there is no study on accounting performance 
with respect to firm value in the airline sector so we are unable to compare the results. 
 
6.1 Future research opportunities 
As we mentioned earlier that there is a lack of availability of research on hedging and the 
accounting performance so our research can open new avenues for researchers in risk 
management to look into different perspectives. This can be done by applying the same 
research in different industries like Oil and gas, commercial listed corporations which can 
give a larger sample size and thus more accurate results. Few more variables can be 
added to the accounting performance firm value measures which are more correlated with 
Tobin’s q like Price to Book Value Ratio. This is ratio of market price to book value per 
share. This ratio is a combination of both historic and future values as market price is 
based on the expectations of the investors. So such accounting variables can explain 
value affects due to hedging in a more comprehensive way. Moreover, this ratio can 
provide an indication of the existence of undervalued assets and thus the firm’s potential 
by holding a double relationship between market and book values. Furthermore, value 
can be measured as EVA (Economic Value Added) and MVA (Market Value Added) 
approach and its correlation with the q value can be estimated. It remains to be seen that 
whether EVA or MVA can produce a less divergent explanation of airline performance in 
comparison to the q value.  
Future research would help in producing more comparable studies in the airline sector 
and thus will open more room for additional researches. New variables can be added and 
the control variables can be changed which would increase the database of empirical 
evidence in the airline industry which at the present moment is very minimal. 
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8. APPENDIX 
Exhibit 1: U.S Consumption of Total Energy by End Use Sector 1973-2009 
 
Percentage
 transportation 
Year Transportation of total Industrial Commercial Residential Totala
1973 18.6 24.6% 32.7 9.5 14.9 75.7
1974 18.1 24.5% 31.8 9.4 14.7 74.0
1975 18.2 25.3% 29.4 9.5 14.8 72.0
1976 19.1 25.1% 31.4 10.0 15.4 76.0
1977 19.8 25.4% 32.3 10.2 15.7 78.0
1978 20.6 25.8% 32.7 10.5 16.2 80.0
1979 20.5 25.3% 34.0 10.6 15.8 80.9
1980 19.7 25.2% 32.1 10.6 15.8 78.1
1981 19.5 25.6% 30.8 10.6 15.4 76.3
1982 19.1 26.1% 27.7 10.9 15.6 73.3
1983 19.2 26.2% 27.5 11.0 15.5 73.1
1984 19.9 25.9% 29.6 11.5 15.8 76.7
1985 20.1 26.3% 28.9 11.5 16.1 76.5
1986 20.9 27.2% 28.4 11.5 15.9 76.8
1987 21.5 27.2% 29.5 12.0 16.2 79.2
1988 21.4 25.8% 30.8 12.6 17.1 82.8
1989 22.6 26.6% 31.4 13.2 17.8 85.0
1990 22.4 26.5% 31.9 13.4 17.0 84.7
1991 22.2 26.2% 31.5 13.5 17.1 84.6
1992 22.5 26.2% 32.7 13.4 17.4 86.0
1993 22.9 26.1% 36.7 13.8 18.3 87.6
1994 23.5 26.3% 33.6 14.1 18.1 89.3
1995 23.8 26.2% 34.0 14.7 18.5 91.2
1996 24.4 25.9% 35.0 15.2 19.5 94.2
1997 24.7 26.1% 35.3 15.7 19.0 94.8
1998 25.3 26.8% 34.9 16.0 19.0 95.2
1999 25.9 26.8% 34.9 16.4 19.6 96.8
2000 26.5 26.8% 34.8 17.2 20.4 99.0
2001 26.3 27.3% 32.8 17.2 20.1 96.3
2002 26.8 27.4% 32.8 17.4 20.8 97.9
2003 27.0 27.5% 32.6 17.4 21.1 98.2
2004 27.9 27.8% 33.6 17.7 21.1 100.4
2005 28.4 28.2% 32.5 17.9 21.7 100.5
2006 28.8 28.9% 32.5 17.8 20.7 99.9
2007 29.1 28.7% 32.6 18.3 21.6 101.6
2008 29.0 29.2% 31.4 18.4 21.6 99.6
2009 27.0 27.1% 28.2 18.1 21.2 99.6
1973–2009 1.0% -0.4% 1.8% 1.0% 0.8%
1999–2009 0.4% -2.1% 1.0% 0.8% 0.3%
Source:
U .S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, 
     April 2010 , Washington, DC, Table 2.1.  (Additional resources:  www.eia.doe.gov)
U. S. Consumption of Total Energy by End-Use Sector, 1973–2009
(quadrillion Btu)
Average annual percentage change
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Exhibit 2: Descriptive Statistics for applied variables 2006-2010 
 
  TOBINSQ LNTOBINSQ CAPEXSALES CR DTA LNTA PC_HEDGED 
Mean (µ) 0.95 (0.05) 0.13 1.18 0.70 22.11 0.24 
Median 0.88 (0.13) 0.06 1.02 0.80 22.30 0.25 
        
Maximum 2.26 0.81 0.87 3.16 1.69 24.53 0.95 
Minimum 0.60 (0.50) (0.09) 0.59 0.00 18.23 0.00 
Std. 
Dev.(σ) 
1.30 0.26 0.21 0.56 0.38 1.69 0.22 
Presented is the table above is the averages of the dependent and independent variables applied in the analysis for 
the period of study (i.e. 2006 to 2010) where LNTOBINSQ = natural log of Tobin’s q, capexsales; proportion of 
capital expenditure to sales, CR; current ratio, DTA; Total debt to total assets and PC_HEDGED; percentage of fuel 
expenses out of total operating expenses hedged. 
Source: Computed from SEC Fillings: http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
 
Exhibit 3: Heteroskedasticity Representation 
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